Abstract
Cash flow control is an important link in the process of enterprise operation and development, just like the "blood" of the enterprise. This paper selects the equity transfer data of state-owned listed companies from 2013 to 2022, and analyzes the impact of mixed-ownership reform on the "blood-making" ability of enterprises from the perspectives of enterprise vitality and efficiency. It is found that state-owned enterprises can improve the efficiency of their employees and enhance their innovation ability through mixed reform, which in turn improves their cash flow growth ability. Further analysis reveals that the mixed reform of SOEs in small and medium-sized enterprises, high-tech enterprises and enterprises in the central region has a stronger effect on the growth of corporate cash flow. The results of this paper provide empirical evidence and policy recommendations for expanding the theoretical literature related to SOE reform, and accordingly deepening the promotion of SOE mixed reform and improving corporate governance practices.
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